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Fact or Fiction ?
On second thought...
Excellent Handling of the War!

Very Ordinary
Filmmaker from LA wants option on this book
Even better than Cons!

Multiple proof
White Chevy Nova
A man who has been abducted many times, tells of them fully.

A book for backyards BBQ
An easy read, on the F18.
A very entertaining book about the Gulf War

A letdown
Another Jack Delmas mysteryThe story then flashes back to the start when Jack was hired by a woman to determine why her daughter, along with three other young people, was murdered in a summer cabin on Dauphine Island. Matters are complicated when Jack's ex-wife runs her mouth about Jack's case. She only told her friend on Dauphine Island, but that was like telling the tabloids. Jack receives a death threat before he half begins his inquiries. The 220 pages following Chapter One are divided into 26 additional chapters.
The case involves possible smuggling, sports betting, environmental fanatics, various local watering holes with hard-drinking pool-playing rednecks, and assorted women (Jimbo is usually on the prowl). The reader learns various details about Jack's past life, and his incompatibility with his ex-wife - their preferred lifestyles are a mismatch (he was from a family of shrimpers and boat builders and played baseball at Ole Miss, she was a Rebelette from a cotton-planting banking family in higher society). Jack's ex- is jealous of the new women in his life, particularly if they have a bigger bust than she has.
The novel has an interesting plot, and contains helpful maps of Dauphine Island and the Mobile County, Alabama area. It will probably be of particular interest to people familiar with the Gulf Coast.
Best in Stable

An orgy by the anti-war and anti-nuke error mongers.This book has 28 chapthers, each by a different author, each grinding his/her own axe - usually the same old tired (and wrong) argument that man-made radiation causes whatever evil is the subject of the day.
In this book, the anti-nukes exploit our veterans to push their own agenda. Shame on them.
Excellent expose of U.S. government use of depleted uraniumIraq was just one victim of this global aggression cloaked in phony platitudes about preserving democracy and human rights.
U.S. troops, as always, are just cannon fodder. The people or Iraq, who were also victimized by the use of depleted uranium are viewed as being less than human in order to justify attacking them.
Reminds you of how racism was used to justify the trade in African people who were enslaved.
required reading for people searching for the facts

research format
KEY BOOK FOR ANY DESERT STORM COLLECTIONThis book saved me a great deal of time and money in my research, and I cannot endorse it enough.
This is the best military-focused book.

The Ottoman Failure in the Persian Gulf StatesAnscombe begins his narrative by tracing the causes for the renewed Ottoman interest in the Arabian Peninsula that arose during the 1870s. Istanbul felt that it needed to reassert its right to rule over the area so that a Wahhabi insurrection could be avoided and so that the Ottoman governance of the area north of the Peninsula, such as Iraq and Syria, could be protected from the raiding tribes that achieved were so prevalent in the Peninsula in the late 19th century. However, as Anscombe also points out, the Ottomans did feel competition from the British in the region. But Anscombe describes that this competition was fictitious and created much more by Ottoman insecurity than actual British interest and action.
The author then proceeds to cover the Ottoman take of the region of Hasa and the subsequent governance of Midhat Pasha in the area. Anscombe looks very favorably upon the programs of Pasha and believes that if Pasha had been allowed to stay in power for a longer period of time, his program would have succeeded in subduing the tribal problems that disrupted Ottoman rule. As Anscombe writes, "Midhat may have been an optimist, yet his visions were not beyond reason" (37) and states later of Pasha's plan to implement taxes on the region and promote agricultural development that, "If implemented as planned, the new economic, administrative, and social regimes would have been marked improvements on the decaying institutions of the Wahhabi era...His successors did not build on his initiatives, and the upheavals that were soon to strike the empire distracted Istanbul's attention for the remainder of the decade. The bad effects of official neglect were to appear within several years of Midhat's departure from Baghdad in 1872" (53).
In the following chapters, Anscombe portrays the numerous problems that eventually caused Ottoman rule to fail in the Arabian Peninsula. Anscombe places the blame for this failure squarely on the Ottomans and the financial difficulties. He writes, "As a result of the empire's extreme financial troubles in the period, anything that was to be attempted in Hasa was to be done cheaply. Money was not to be invested there, it was to be extracted. In such a harried atmosphere, political efficiency received as little attention as the economy. Consequently, little trace of Midhat's plans survived, and when challenges to the Ottomans' position rose thickly in the 1890s, they found that it rested on a fatally flawed foundation" (55). Thus, it was not the British, but rather the Ottomans that are at fault for the turmoil in the Persian Gulf states from the late 19th century until the outbreak of WWI. Incredibly corrupt Ottoman officials attempted to extract taxes from the local population that created a great deal of resentment to the Ottoman presence in the area. The Ottomans dug their own grave. Bribes amongst officials were common and such horrible governors as Bazi only caused hatred for Ottoman influence in the Peninsula.
Anscombe is able to effectively close his narrative and prove his thesis by following Mubarak's insurrection in Kuwait. Anscombe dispels the contention that Mubarak's success came from long and developed British involvement in his revolt. Rather, the author illustrates how it took a great deal of time and pressure to finally get the British to support Mubarak and it was the inability of the Ottomans to deal with Mubarak that was the true cause of the upheaval's success. Anscombe even goes so far as to state in his conclusion that, "On the whole, Britain's experience in the Gulf prior to the war was positive, especially when compared to the mixed fortunes of the Ottomans" (173). While a slightly more comprehensive dealing with history prior to 1870 would help the strength of Anscombe's objective, he is able to convey in a limited number of pages a very compressive survey of the region. The portrait he paints of the Persian Gulf states prior to 1914 is one of disorder and chaos chiefly due to the Ottoman inability to govern effectively in the region.
Overall, Anscombe is very successful in showing how Ottoman, and not British influence, was the direct cause of the states in the Arabian Peninsula. By chronicling the ineptitude of Ottoman governance in the region and highlighting the financial difficulties that limited the amount of control the Ottomans could exert of the area, Anscombe is able to contradict convincingly the notion of British superiority of influence in the history of the Persian Gulf states. While the author does not ignore the obvious impact of British influence after World War I and the discovery of oil deposits in the region, he points out the lack of intention and planned involvement in the affairs of Arabia that British showed before 1914. The inability of the Ottomans to control tribal factions and institute a government that appeased the people of the region was a much more significant factor to political development in Arabia than any pre-1914 British involvement. Responsibility for the Ottoman loss of the Arabian Peninsula rests solely with Ottoman inadequacy and blame directed at outside sources is only an attempt to divert this responsibility. Anscombe's analysis of the history behind the formation of the states is entirely successful in highlighting this responsibility of the Ottomans for their Empire's own problems and failing reign in the region.
New perspective on gulf historyAnscombe is particularly interested in the economic factors which hindered Ottoman attempts to subjugate the eastern Arabian littoral (largely, between Qatar and Kuwait) during the period 1870-1914. The initial impetus for the Ottoman policy of asserting control over this largely autonomous area was provided by the British. The Ottomans were concerned that British obsession with maintaining the routes to India would result in attempts to establish hegemony over the Gulf (in which the British already had a large presence), Arabia and Kuwait. These fears had some justification during the last quarter of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th. But the Ottoman plan for bringing eastern Arabia under tighter control was doomed from the outset, because however well-conceived the plans for doing so, the Ottomans had neither the economic strength nor the will to bring their plans to fruition.
Al-Hasa, the province of eastern Arabia bordering the Gulf, had little to offer the Ottomans in the way of economic return. This meant that the reforms, the communications infrastructure and, ultimately, the political dependence which the Ottomans intended to establish in the region would have to be funded by the Porte. With external pressure already being brought to bear in more strategically significant areas, such as the Balkans, Hasa ranked very low on the Ottoman list of priorities. This over-arching point has been made by Kelly, Busch and others, but Anscombe's study offers confirming evidence from the Ottoman perspective.
Anscombe's text of 173 pages is accompanied by some rough and unhelpful maps, ill-situated in the text. The 60 pages of endnotes contain many interesting substantive points, some of which would have been better woven into the text.
The Ottoman Gulf is suited to students of modern Ottoman history, the modern Middle East and the British Empire. For these readers, Anscombe has provided a valuable study.
The Ottoman Connection

Interesting but pricey
A thorough history of the Naval dimension of Desert StormThe book opens with a brief and useful historical overview of the Navy's presence in the Gulf and the run up to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. While the story of how the US Military arrived at its plan to fight the war is interesting, the account of the logistics of the buildup is somewhat tedious. I realize logistics are the backbone of any military operation; but it just wasn't that interesting except as part of an official history.
The authors deserve credit for addressing the problems the Navy faced: a lack of integration with the other services, infighting among the Generals (Army and USAF) and Admirals, and an ill-conceived mine laying operations that cost two pilots their lives, for example. It avoids being "whiney" about slights during the air campaign from an Air Force dominated air warfare command structure, yet is somewhat bogged down in details about tasking orders and control systems.
This book will probably only be interesting to the more die hard Naval historian and students of Joint Military Operations for lessons learned. For a good account of modern Naval Warfare, I would be more inclined to recommend Admiral Sandy Woodward's "One Hundred Days" about the Falklands War.
Nice treatment - good book

Not Enough Personal ExperienceThe Author,however, also attempts to interleave in the narrative a history of the surface actions in the South Pacicfic theater in 1942-1943. It appears that he liberally summarizes the Morrison hisory "Breaking the Bismark Barrier" without adding much if anything and deleting a lot. The presentation is certainly mechanical. Even the charts are cheap reproductions from the Morrision book.
For some reason the author does not describe his experinces with the destroyer from Pearl Harbor through Midway and etc. This to me would be much more interesting than a repeat of a book I have read several times and a lengthy discussion of the fallacies of the US torpedo program that thousands of authors have already covered ad nauseum. The torpedo problem was,though, a hugely important issue. What the author did add was that prior to the battle at Vella Gulf, he insisted that the Maurie's torpedo depth settings be set to mininum to compensate for faulty controls. This truly may have had a significant effect on the outcome of the battle.
The destroyer book for which I have been waiting 50 years
Technically and historically excellent